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In this paper, I explore the hypothesis that constructions — here understood 
primarily as the dependencies of Word Grammar — can undergo systematic 
change, sometimes partly due to the effects of the grammaticalization of a 
lexical item or class of lexical items. I argue that the development of will as a 
future tense marker in English involves the development of a new construction 
where two separate syntactic items are associated with a single event in the 
semantics. I also look at the loss of the impersonal construction in English, 
where it has been argued that the change is driven by an increase in the 
s chematicity of the Transitive Construction, as well as having been argued 
that dative experiencers have been reclassified as subjects. I observe that it 
has also been noted that dative experiencers could function as subjects in 
e arlier varieties of English, and suggest that this is an example of category 
strengthening.
Keywords: auxiliation, construction grammar, constructional emergence, 
grammaticalization, impersonal constructions, Word Grammar
1.	 Introduction
There is an emerging body of work which explores the idea that symbolic 
theories of grammar which combine form and meaning (as in a sign or a con-
struction) are useful frameworks for the discussion of grammaticalization, for 
*  I would like to thank the editors of this special issue, Thomas Hoffmann and Graeme Trousdale 
for the invitation to contribute and for their comments on an earlier version, audiences at 
NRG4 in Leuven and ISLE1 in Freiburg for their views, four anonymous referees for various 
comments and suggestions, and Dick Hudson and Amanda Patten for extensive discussions of 
a draft version. Email <n.gisborne@ed.ac.uk>
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two main reasons. First, a construction can constitute a target for grammatical-
ization and, secondly, constructions themselves can undergo various changes 
which resemble (some of  ) the changes found in grammaticalization. Work that 
is informed by these observations includes Bisang (1998), Traugott (2003, 
2007), Himmelmann (2004), Hilpert (2008), Trousdale (2008c, forthcoming), 
Patten (2010a) and Gisborne and Patten (forthcoming). A number of relevant 
issues are discussed in Hoffmann and Trousdale’s introduction to the present 
volume. It is now clear that there is emerging common ground among scholars 
working with the question how construction grammar(s) might inform gram-
maticalization research and at the same time it is evident that there are some 
interesting debates to be had ( Noël 2007). This paper is intended as a contribu-
tion both the growing body of work that argues that grammaticalization can be 
fruitfully investigated from the perspective of a construction grammar and to 
the debates about what the limits of that investigation should be.
In this paper I discuss the grammaticalization of various secondary predica-
tion structures, involving non-finite predicative complementation, using Word 
Grammar (WG). I describe the theory in Section 2, but it suffices to say here 
that, like the theories in Langacker (1987, 1991) and Lakoff (1987) it is an 
explicitly cognitive theory first reported in Hudson’s (1984) monograph Word 
Grammar and that it is a constructional theory, organised around two inheri-
tance hierarchies: a hierarchy of lexemes and lexical categories, and a hierar-
chy of dependencies and dependency types. Both lexical items and dependen-
cies in WG are constructions (Gisborne 2008, 2010; Holmes 2005; Hudson 
2007, 2008). However, unlike other constructional theories, WG eschews 
phrases. The exploitation of WG has one significant advantage for this discus-
sion, which is that it is possible to show the internal dimensions of construc-
tions within a geometric (rather than an algebraic) representation. This allows 
us to explore how the internal dimensions of a construction change in the con-
text of the grammaticalization of the items that occur in the construction.1 
However, I have kept the WG-specific machinery to a minimum in the paper.
Here, I explore two cases studies: English auxiliation, with a particular case-
study of the future use of will, where I argue that the construction itself under-
goes grammaticalization, and that the WG network allows us to make an ap-
propriately fine-grained analysis of the nature of the change in the construction; 
and the loss of impersonal constructions in English — with a brief excursus on 
1.  Although construction grammars which exploit Attribute-value matrices, such as Sign-based 
Construction Grammar, are also able to model the internal structure of a construction, and 
therefore changes in its internal composition. See Fried (2009) for a usage-based version of 
the theory, and Fillmore et al. (2007) for a version of Sign-based Construction Grammar which 
is not usage based. See Goldberg (2006) for a discussion and comparison of the different kinds 
of construction grammar.
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Icelandic quirky case marking. The paper has the following structure: Section 
2 discusses construction grammars; Section 3 looks at grammaticalization and 
the modelling of grammaticalization in a constructional model; Section 4 is a 
case study sketch of auxiliation; Section 5 is a case study sketch of oblique sub-
jects and the loss of impersonals in English; Section 6 presents the c onclusions.
2.	 Construction	grammars	and	Word	Grammar
There are various different construction grammars, but there are some proper-
ties which are shared by all constructional theories so it is reasonable to assert 
that construction grammars share key features. Goldberg (1995, 2006), Croft 
and Cruse (2004), and Croft (2001) all exploit default inheritance, they all treat 
grammar as a declarative database consisting of a hierarchical network of con-
structions and construction types, and they all assume the idea that language is 
symbolic — that there are associations of form and meaning — so we can take 
these to be essential features of construction grammars.2 Hudson (2007) makes 
the same claims for WG, which differs from other construction grammars in 
that it eschews phrases and therefore makes no use of meronymic or “part-of ” 
relations. Cognitive versions of construction grammar, including WG, assume 
that grammar is “usage based” — that grammatical knowledge is induced by 
the speaker from their exposure to linguistic data as a speaker and as a hearer, 
and from the earliest stages of language acquisition. That is, there is a claim 
that language is not innate, and not discrete, but rather that it is emergent in the 
context of experience, and that it shares its structures and properties with the 
rest of general cognition. In a number of respects, these positions are like those 
articulated in Hopper (1987), although a Word Grammarian would also argue 
that speakers and hearers do induce sometimes quite abstract grammars, and 
the rules of those grammars are amenable to formal analysis.
In the rest of this section, I explore default inheritance, the idea that g rammar 
is a network, and the idea that language is symbolic and explore their signifi-
cance for theorizing grammaticalization, which I discuss at more length in the 
next section.
We can start with default inheritance. Modern construction grammars are all 
organised around default inheritance (Goldberg 2006: 215). In default inheri-
tance, categorization is flexible: elements are assigned to categories, even if 
they do not have all of the features which are associated with a category, so 
a three-legged dog is still a dog. There are three main features of default 
i nheritance:
2.  But note that earlier versions of Fillmore and Kay’s version of construction grammar worked 
with complete inheritance, rather than defaults, see Fillmore et al. (1988).
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–  it allows the modelling of prototypicality by dispensing with “necessary” 
and “sufficient” conditions for category membership;
–  in the WG version, categories are established inductively, and in re-
sponse to the experience of tokens — another way of saying this is that 
categories emerge due to experience, and there are no absolute “objective” 
categories;
–  the way default inheritance works means that information is only inherited 
if it is active and salient.
The first two points make theories that adopt this view of inheritance clear 
examples of cognitive theories. Prototypicality works in tandem with the 
“best-fit” principle: tokens are assigned to categories on the basis of whether it 
makes sense to assign them in that way. For example, imagine a nineteenth 
century explorer encountering a duck-billed platypus for the first time. Is it a 
mammal? No, because it lays eggs. Yes, because it’s warm blooded. No, be-
cause its body temperature is too low. Yes, because it has fur. Even though it is 
not a prototypical mammal, it makes sense in some ways to classify the duck-
billed platypus as a mammal, because of its mammalian properties, but once 
you have established that it is not a prototypical mammal, and once you’ve met 
other similar animals, it makes sense to establish a subtype of mammal — the 
monotreme. We hypothesize that human cognition works like this, and that 
categories are plastic.
Goldberg (2006: 215) distinguishes between contemporary Unification 
Construction Grammar on the one hand and Cognitive Grammar, Cognitive 
Construction Grammar and Radical Construction Grammar on the other. All of 
these theories exploit default inheritance, but Unification Construction Gram-
mar is not usage-based, whereas the other theories are. WG is also usage-based, 
as I have said, so the assumption is that usage patterns are stored and general-
izations are induced over them. The categories of WG are inductively arrived 
at, as are individual concepts and the network of associations that link them. 
WG, like other usage-based theories, assumes that the grammar is at least 
transparent to the parser-processor, as well as assuming that semantics includes 
encyclopaedic information. This means that the architecture of WG permits 
it to model semantics- and pragmatics-led change in lexical items, similar 
changes in dependencies (or constructions), and to model grammatical changes 
led by parsing effects.
A discussion of inheritance leads to a discussion of how the grammar is or-
ganised as a network. Construction grammars assume that grammar, indeed the 
whole of language, is a hierarchical taxonomic network. So does WG, but 
where other construction grammars assume that there are part-whole relations, 
in that they adopt phrase structure, WG assumes that there are only hierarchical 
relationships (in the default inheritance hierarchy) and associative links. Note 
Brought to you by | University of Edinburgh
Authenticated | 129.215.19.197
Download Date | 7/15/13 4:03 PM
Constructions, Word Grammar, and grammaticalization 159
that associative relations are not stated in a phrase structure. If a VP (mini-
mally) consists of a V node and an NP node, for example, then the associa-
tive relation between that verb and the NP — the Object relationship — is not 
stated in the phrase structure, although it might additionally be stated in the 
construction.
Goldberg (1995, 2006), Croft (2001), and Croft and Cruse (2004) all assume 
that there are, or can be, associative relations within constructions. Goldberg 
exploits grammatical function information (subject, object, indirect object) and 
Croft discusses the differences between grammatical roles and grammatical 
relations. It is also worth pointing out that Taylor (2004) and Verhagen (2003) 
also argue for the explicit inclusion of other than hierarchical relations between 
subparts of constructions in formal and semantic representations. But for WG, 
the whole of grammar is just an associative network — the syntax too. There 
is no phrase structure, and the associative relations between words (subject, 
object, complement), the words themselves, and the classifications of those 
words, are the only structures syntax supports.
One of the key elements of the claim that construction grammar has a spe-
cial utility for the study of grammatical change is that it is a symbolic theory. 
What does this mean, and in particular what does it mean in terms of WG? We 
can explore these ideas by looking at a simple construction — the lexeme. In 
Figure 1, I have presented a WG representation of a monomorphemic common 
count noun. All constructional theories would agree that words and lexemes 
were constructions, so exploring this diagram allows us to see what the p atterns 
Figure 1. The lexeme cat
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of WG look like, and how they are similar to construction grammar, and how 
they differ. The “meaning” pole of the construction uses single quotation marks 
around concepts; the formal pole of the construction is in italics (see Croft and 
Cruse 2004: 258).
The diagram represents syntactic information (the classification of cat); 
s emantic information (the sense of cat); morpho-syntactic information to do 
with inflection; and realizational information. There are various other features 
in the diagram which we can see. Arrows are associative links. The lines from 
the apex of a triangle to a concept are a way of showing inheritance links: the 
base of the triangle points at the classifying node, the apex at the classified 
node. The upside-down triangle with a line from singular to cat says that cat is 
an instance of the category singular. The form cat is the singular form of the 
lexeme cat; and so it instantiates both the lexeme and the morphosyntactic 
category. Likewise, the similar relationship between common noun and cat 
shows that the lexeme cat is an instance of the category common noun. So the 
diagram also shows that there are classificatory relations at different levels of 
grammar, if we are happy to distinguish syntactic feature information from 
syntactic category information.
In the semantics, the concept ‘cat’ is classified as both ‘mammal’ and ‘pet’. 
This shows us that it is possible to have multiple category membership, 
or — thinking in terms of inheritance — multiple inheritance, as long as the in-
herited features do not clash.3 It also shows us that semantic information is 
encyclopaedic — cats purr, and cats have retractile claws. Finally, the diagram 
shows that the different domains of grammar — from morphology to encyclo-
paedic semantics — are linked by associative relations which are also the rela-
tions that are found within domains. This last part is crucial to the modelling of 
change, because it allows us to show that change can happen within a domain 
of grammar, say semantics, which can cause a change in the associative nature 
of the grammar, say between semantics and syntactic category.
Constructional theories and theories such as WG allow us to model very pre-
cisely where change can happen. In particular, we can see how meaning change 
can have an effect on grammatical classification and morpho( phono)logical 
realization; it also points out the wealth of facts that is contained in a single 
(simple) lexical entry and (therefore) other types of construction. Diachronic-
ally, we can see how the network changes: the research challenge is to see what 
patterns of predictability emerge. In Section 4, I discuss a change in the net-
work which is, I think, a regular process commonly found in the Germanic 
languages.
3.  See also Hoffmann and Trousdale’s introduction to this volume for a longer discussion of 
multiple inheritance, and an account of how inheritance is relevant to the analysis of d iachrony.
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3.	 Grammaticalization
Symbolic theories of grammar which combine form and meaning (as in a sign 
or a construction) are useful locations for discussing grammaticalization, be-
cause the symbolic units can constitute a “target” for grammaticalization and 
because the symbolic units themselves can undergo processes of change with 
resemble those found in grammaticalization. It is, therefore, possible to see 
constructional change as it applies to the lexeme (grammaticalization) as a 
subtype of a more general kind of constructional change.
In grammaticalization, it is a commonplace to assert that grammatical 
change is led by changes in meaning (including subjectification); that it is in-
cremental; that it is unidirectional; that it involves reanalysis; and that the gen-
eral cognitive mechanism of analogy is how it spreads through the cognitive 
system. Reanalysis can occur because of categorical similarity and analogical 
reasoning, but on the other hand it can be parsing-led (Hawkins 1994) as well 
as led by meaning change. For a discussion of the general processes of gram-
maticalization, see Hopper and Traugott (2003).
In traditional theories of grammaticalization, where the diachronic cline 
from full lexical item to affix is explored, it is assumed that the grammatical-
ization item changes with no particular regard for the way in which the change 
shapes the surrounding grammar, or interacts with it. In the theoretical discus-
sion I mentioned in my introduction, it is assumed that a grammaticalizing ele-
ment can affect the larger constructional units of the grammar (Himmelmann 
2004 calls this “host-class expansion”) and that these larger constructional 
units can also undergo diachronic processes which look very like grammatical-
ization. It has been widely noticed that constructions can become more sche-
matic (Himmelmann 2004; Traugott 2007; Trousdale 2008b). In advancing the 
claim that constructions grammaticalize by becoming more schematic, Trous-
dale (2008c) means that its semantics become more abstract among other things: 
“Increased productivity, increased generalisation, and decreased composition-
ality, taken together, are evidence of the T[ransitive] C[construction] having 
grammaticalized over time”. Trousdale (2008a) also notes, however, that con-
structions can also undergo processes that are rather more like lexicalization.
But there are other changes that constructions can undergo, which are also 
found in grammaticalization. As Patten (2010a) observes in her discussion of 
the it-cleft, diachronically constructions may become polysemous and their 
semantics can also undergo subjectification. As she shows, the development of 
the English it-cleft involves a development of both constructional polysemy, 
so that the it-cleft construction sanctions both specificational clefts and pred-
icational clefts and, in so-called Information Presupposition clefts there is 
e vidence of the construction undergoing subjectification. Hudson (1997) 
makes a different point. He argues that constructions can undergo “category 
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strengthening” as new categories become more entrenched and as the con-
structional network changes its architecture over time.
I said in the introduction that a construction can be a “target” for grammati-
calization. What does that mean? I have two answers in mind. One is what I 
have just described for the it-cleft; the other concerns reanalysis as a result of 
analogical reasoning. Some kinds of construction (lexemes) are distributed 
within others (grammatical constructions); see Croft and Cruse (2004: 255) on 
the grammar-lexicon continuum. Hudson (1984, 1990) also argues that there is 
no discrete grammar. As lexemes undergo grammaticalization, so their distri-
bution can change, from a grammatical construction of Type A to one of Type 
B. A simple example would be the modal can, which is a relatively late entrant 
to the modal category. The new category of Modal Auxiliary took can from 
being a verb which occurs in a range of constructions (including the transitive 
construction) to being a verb which has its distribution limited to the modal 
auxiliary construction, arguably before it developed fully modal meanings. 
Warner (1993: 182) claims that it is only in the nineteenth century that can has 
clearly deontic and epistemic senses.
There are other reasons why we might want to think about grammaticaliza-
tion in terms of constructional approaches. Grammaticalization theory assumes 
that language change happens in usage: functionalist theories cannot r easonably 
claim that a language is like it is because of functional pressures, because there 
is too much diversity in natural languages. But functionalist theories can rea-
sonably claim that languages change as they do because of functional pres-
sures. In the model advanced here, it is in the nature of categorization that 
change can happen. A usage-based model like WG employs categories that are 
responsive to experience, so categories can change. It is also worth noting that 
the main locus for change for formal theories — acquisition — is another do-
main of usage. Acquisition is usage.4
In the case studies in the next two sections, we shall see examples of cate-
gory strengthening, constructional polysemy, and arguably subjectification, as 
well as reanalysis through analogical reasoning.
4.	 Case	study	1:	auxiliation
Following Heine (1993) and Kuteva (2001) I am leaving voice to one side al-
together. My illustrative case study in this section is the change in the construc-
tion that is necessary to understand future will, but first I want to place that 
discussion in the wider context of auxiliation in English. We can start with a 
4.  This view is at odds with the Chomskyan view, perhaps most forcefully articulated by Light-
foot (1979, 1991), that acquisition is language change.
Brought to you by | University of Edinburgh
Authenticated | 129.215.19.197
Download Date | 7/15/13 4:03 PM
Constructions, Word Grammar, and grammaticalization 163
quote from Bolinger, “The moment a verb is given an infinitive complement, 
that verb starts down the road of auxiliariness.” (Bolinger 1980: 297, quoted 
by Heine 1993: 27). Bolinger’s remarks suggest that any verb which has non-
finite complementation is on a cline which has full lexical verbs at one end, and 
auxiliaries at the other.
I have nothing new to add to the facts about how auxiliaries emerged in 
English, so I shall limit myself to a brief presentation of the textbook story. The 
emergence of the modal system in English involves two sets of changes: those 
specific to the modals, and various contextual changes. There were three main 
changes which were specific to the modals. With the exception of willan, the 
modals emerged out of the preterite present verbs of Old English.5
–  The preterite present verbs underwent a restriction in their semantics: as 
they developed modal meanings, so they lost their non-modal senses. For 
example, Denison (1993: 295) glosses Old English magan as ‘to have 
power’. This verb is the source of the modern English modal may.
–  The complementation of these verbs became restricted. They lost direct 
objects, PP complements and the like, and became restricted to construc-
tions consisting of Modal + bare infinitive. For example, Denison (1993: 
306) gives the example Who wil the curnell of the nut must break the shell 
(1577 Grange, Golden Aphrodite I iij b [OED s.v. will, v1. B. 1]), where the 
form wil means ‘want’ and has a direct object, which shows persistence of 
historical sense and complementation pattern.
–  The emerging class of modal verbs lost their finite inflections and their 
non-finite forms. The modern day modals are invariant, but Old English 
cunnan, for example, had the paradigm cann, canst, cann (for the 1st to 3rd 
person singular), and cunnon, cuþest, cuþe (for the 1st to 3rd person plural).
And there were two main changes, or sets of changes, which were contextual.
–  Members of the class of preterite present verbs which did not develop into 
modal verbs were also lost. Examples include gemunan ‘remember’ and 
witan ‘know’.
–  The distribution and syntactic behaviour of lexical verbs became restricted. 
In particular they lost the ability to invert in interrogative clauses and they 
lost the ability to be directly negated.
The emergence of the only tense auxiliary in English (I am assuming that shall 
is obsolete), will, is part of the story of the emergence of the modal auxiliaries. 
There is still some debate whether will is a tense auxiliary, as Declerck (2006) 
argues, or a modal whose semantics of futurity are implicatures, as Huddleston 
5.  See Denison (1993: 295–296) and Warner (1993: 142) for discussion of the status of willan. 
Warner observes that it has some preterite present properties.
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and Pullum (2002) claim. In this paper I take the view that it is syntactically a 
modal verb which is semantically a tense auxiliary.
Less significant for my discussion here, but still involving a relationship 
between the grammaticalization of the auxiliaries involved and changes in 
their host constructions, the history of the aspectual auxiliaries of English is 
slightly different. The emergence of progressive constructions with be +ing is 
relatively late, with dynamic verbs with present time reference still occurring 
in the simple present at the turn of the 16th century. The emergence of the per-
fect construction, especially have with a past participle (have rather than be) 
involves the reanalysis of resultative constructions as perfects, and the re-
analysis of adjectival participles as perfect or past participles (Denison 1993: 
340 –370). In both cases, the grammaticalization of the auxiliary involves 
c onstructional emergence: as Denison (1993: 340) puts it, the perfect “is a 
syntagm”.
Pullum and Wilson (1979) offer an analysis of auxiliaries which helps with 
the analysis of auxiliation. One of the obvious first questions is what the syntax 
of an auxiliary is: Heine (1993) is concerned with whether there is a category 
“AUX”. Pullum and Wilson argue that the auxiliary is the head of the construc-
tion with the lexical verb its dependent. This theory works better in several 
ways than the alternative that the auxiliary is the dependent in the construction, 
with the lexical verb as its head because it gives continuity with the lexical 
verb it derives from. It means that we can see changes in emerging auxiliaries 
as changes in their form and their complementation, which do not involve 
changes in their distribution. As we shall see, both lexical verbs which take 
infinitive predicative complements and auxiliaries are involved in the same 
syntactic structures. As a result, we can see the emergence of an auxiliary as a 
conspiracy of semantic change, the relevant contextual change, and the con-
structional change detailed subsequently.
The auxiliary as head analysis also gives a reasonable description of the 
facts, especially ellipsis information. See the examples in (1).
(1) a. ‘May I go to the bathroom?’ ‘You may.’
 b. ‘Could Peter have arrived in Manchester by now?’ ‘He could.’
 c. ‘Will you go to the Ambassador’s ball?’ ‘I will.’
We can explore the continuity with lexical verbs by exploring Falk (1984) and 
the xcomp analysis of auxiliaries. This analysis argues that auxiliary verbs in-
stantiate a kind of non-finite predication much like matrix lexical verbs that 
take non-finite complements. Falk’s theory is worked out in LFG, which is a 
model where there are directly assigned grammatical functions between words. 
Although LFG is different from WG in that it has a level of phrase structure, its 
adoption of grammatical functions as primitives means that it has a level of 
analysis which is similar to WG.
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In Figure 2, I present a version of Falk’s analysis of auxiliary constructions. 
Falk argues that the auxiliary verb has an xcomp (the grammatical function for 
a predicative complement) which shares its subject with the subject of the aux-
iliary. Hudson (1990: 121) presents a similar analysis of WG, although Hud-
son’s terminology is slightly different (Hudson 1990: 117, has “incomplement” 
for xcomp).
As Figure 3 shows, the network of relations surrounding an auxiliary verb is 
the same as the network that surrounds a lexical verb which takes an infinitive 
complement. In a relational theory such as LFG or WG, a lexical verb such as 
try or seem takes an infinitival xcomp, which just as with the auxiliaries, shares 
its subject with the subject of the lexical verb.
In LFG, there are further elements to the analysis because the theory adopts 
a level of phrase structure, and assumes that there are clauses as part of the 
architecture of the theory. In WG, on the other hand, the network of dependen-
cies, and classification of the individual words is all the syntactic structure 
there is.
The xcomp construction is associated with two different semantic patterns, 
and a range of different semantic relations. These are discussed in Gisborne 
(2010) chapters 3 and 6, as well as in Gisborne (2008), and it is reasonable to 
conclude that the xcomp relation is a construction type. It is a construction 
because it involves a number of relations between a range of different words: 
xcomp is not merely a dependency between the matrix verb and its non-finite 
complement. It also forces there to be additional structure: the subject relation 
between running/run in Figure 2 and Felix is there because the xcomp relation 
requires running/run to have a grammatical subject. But it is also a construc-
tion because this syntax is associated with particular semantics. The difference 
between try and seem in constructions like those in Figure 3 is not a syntactic 
Figure 2. The xcomp analysis of auxiliary constructions
Figure 3. The xcomp analysis of subject control/raising constructions.
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difference, but a semantic one: try’s sense assigns a semantic role to its sub-
ject; seem’s sense does not. This semantic difference is a kind of constructional 
polysemy,6 and the case is worked out in Gisborne (2008). Subsequently, we 
shall see a third semantic pattern, so it will become clear that the polysemy is 
even further developed.7
We can ask two questions at this point. What evidence is there that there is a 
subject relationship between Felix and running/run/to run in these diagrams? 
And what is the “clause structure” of these examples?8 Some evidence that 
Felix is the subject of the non-finite verb as well as the finite verb comes from 
the distribution of reflexive pronouns. It is widely hypothesized that reflexive 
pronouns and their antecedents have to be dependents of the same head. If the 
reflexive pronoun is an object, then its antecedent has to be the subject of the 
same head. There are some examples in (2).
(2) a. Felix is perjuring himself.
 b. Felix has perjured himself.
 c. Felix will perjure himself.
 d. Felix tried/seemed to perjure himself.
In each of the examples in (2), himself is the object of perjure, so we will as-
sume that the antecedent of himself is also an argument of perjure — and there-
fore its subject.9
6.  Constructional polysemy is the idea that a construction itself may have a range of meanings; 
the idea is discussed by Goldberg (1995) in the context of an account of the different meanings 
of the ditransitive construction. In the case of raising and control patterns, verbs like begin, 
which may occur in both patterns, are evidence of constructional polysemy.
7.  The claim that raising and control are semantically different, but not syntactically, works for 
English, although there is evidence that in other languages such as Greek and Icelandic there 
are empirically discernible syntactic differences. In part, the evidence for these syntactic dif-
ferences is the raising of non-nominative subjects which I review in Section 5. This question, 
of course, is different from the theoretical question of how the raising/control difference should 
be represented, and whether the theorist tolerates mismatch between syntax and semantics.
8.  The second question, of course, invites us to ask what we might mean by “clause structure”. I 
shall assume that what is commonly called “clause structure” in examples like those in (2) is 
nothing of the kind. It is actually propositional structure, i.e. in the semantics, and the proper 
question is whether these predicative constructions involve one or two propositions, rather 
than one or two clauses. There is, after all, no independent morphosyntactic evidence of 
clausehood (such as tense) in these examples. As it happens, I have been led to this position 
because WG does not include clauses in its theoretical machinery, but the observation is inde-
pendent of WG’s theoretical position on clausehood.
9.  A referee observes “objects can also bind reflexives, like in ‘I gave him a picture of himself’ ”. 
But not direct objects, and in any case there is only one argument in the examples in (2). The 
point I am making is that in these examples Felix must be the subject of perjuring, perjured, 
and perjure as well as the matrix verb in order to bind the reflexive pronoun.
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So far, I have discussed the syntax, and the raising/control distinction. The 
argument is that both raising and control verbs involve the same network of 
dependencies, and so they share the same syntax. Now, I want to discuss the 
semantics in greater detail. The reason for this is that for will to be a tense 
auxiliary, it involves another semantic property: a will+bare infinitive con-
struct denotes a single event. The examples shown in Figure 3 all involve two 
propositions or events. It is the development of the single-event semantics that 
is at issue here. To explore this development, we need to explore some diag-
nostics for event and propositional structure.
The examples in (2) raise two questions about the nature of the propositions 
described. Why are there differences in propositional structure? The examples 
in (a)–(c) involve one proposition; (d) involves two. How do we know when 
there is one proposition rather than two? It’s not straightforward to establish 
when there is one proposition and when two. For example, to infinitive clauses 
can express separate propositions from their matrix verbs, but they need not, as 
the examples in (3) show. The same applies to bare infinitive clauses.
(3) a. We started to run.
 b. We intended to run.
In (3a), the incipient stage of a running event is described; in (3b), on the other 
hand, there are two separate propositions — the intending proposition and the 
content of the intention, which is that we should run. One diagnostic for propo-
sitional structure is scope with negation. Take the examples in (4).
(4) a. We didn’t start to run.
 b. !We started not to run.
 c. We didn’t intend to run.
 d. We intended not to run.
The example in (4b) is semantically ill-formed (which is what the “!” diacritic 
means) because ‘running’, the concept associated with to run, does not enter 
into a separate propositional structure. On the other hand, the example in (4d) 
is not semantically ill-formed because in this example, ‘running’ does enter 
into a separate propositional structure. We can see, then, that a to infinitive 
xcomp can express an independent proposition, or it can “merge” semantically 
with the matrix verb to form a single proposition.
Likewise, there is no rule that predicts whether a bare infinitive complement 
creates a separate proposition or not.
(5) a. I’ll go.
 b. I’ll not go.
 c. We let him take the poison.
 d. We let him not take the poison.
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The examples in (5a, b) show that ’ll go forms a single proposition. The ex-
ample in (5b) is fully grammatical, but it is the scope facts that are central. 
There is no scope variability: negation does not scope under ‘will’ in (5b), but 
has to have wide scope. For it to scope under ‘will’, there would have to be an 
antonym of ‘going’, ‘not-going’, because it would have to be necessary to bare 
events to be negated. But it is propositions that are negated, not events. In the 
examples in (5c, 5d), on the other hand, it is possible for not to have narrow 
scope under let, and so we have to treat this xcomp as one that creates a dis-
crete proposition in conceptual structure. From this, we have to conclude that 
there is no 1-1 correspondence between the word class of the word which is the 
xcomp, and whether the xcomp establishes a discrete proposition in conceptual 
structure.
This is an important finding, because it suggests that predicative structures 
involving xcomps are exactly the kind of location where we might expect to 
find grammaticalization processes taking place. Although there is debate about 
whether grammaticalization requires there to be ambiguity — Heine (2002) ar-
gues that it is, whereas Traugott (forthcoming) provides counterexamples — it 
is certainly the case that ambiguous constructions are open to reanalysis.
There is not just the one ambiguity — one proposition or two — that I have 
been describing. A further ambiguity is that both bare infinitive xcomps and to 
infinitive xcomps can have either events or propositions as their associated 
conceptual structures. In we began to go, the xcomp to go is eventive; in we 
saw the dog cross the road, the xcomp structure the dog cross the road de-
scribes an event and not a proposition. Note too that it is possible to have dif-
ferent realizations of the same semantics. Both of the examples in (6) express 
the same semantics.
(6) a. We started to run.
 b. We started running.
I take it that both examples in (6) involve the same dependencies, subject and 
xcomp, and that the only difference is in the realization. Syntactic selection in 
these examples is lexically governed — start can have either a to infinitive or 
an –ing participle as its xcomp, whereas stop can only occur with the participle 
if it is to have a single-event semantics: stop to run does not mean the same as 
stop running.
The event vs. proposition issue is important here, because it allows us to 
distinguish between aspectual auxiliation and tense auxiliation. Aspectual aux-
iliation involves a single proposition, as I have said, but there are two events 
within the proposition. Tense auxiliation, on the other hand, expresses a single 
proposition which involves just a single event semantics. Furthermore, from 
the discussion of both we can see that there is no simple predictive relationship 
between syntax and semantics and therefore we need semantic diagnostics to 
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explore both the event/proposition question, and the “how many p ropositions?” 
question. The fact that we need semantic diagnostics is important, because it 
tells us that we are dealing with constructional polysemy, which Gisborne and 
Patten (2010) show is related to constructional change.
In the generative literature, the phenomenon of xcomps being in a structure 
which denotes either one or two propositions is known as “restructuring”, 
which involves “some sort of reduced structure associated with clause union” 
(Miller 2002: 39). Miller identifies various properties of restructuring; one key 
one is, “Non-restructuring infinitives permit independent temporal specifica-
tions . . . but restructuring infinitives do not”.10 Therefore, (7a) is a “non- 
restructuring” pattern and (7b) is a “restructuring” one.
(7) a. Maria decided at Christmas to visit John on his birthday.
 b.  *Maria tried at Christmas to visit John on his birthday.
 [This example is ungrammatical unless John’s birthday is at Christmas.]
In the generative literature, the issue with restructuring patterns is whether they 
involve “monoclausal” or “biclausal” structures, because the propositional 
structures I have just identified are assumed to belong to different syntactic 
structures. Miller (2002: 41) says, “restructuring verbs typically include want, 
motion verbs, aspectual verbs (begin, continue, finish), modals, subjectless 
causatives, and, with some variation, try and implicative verbs (   fail, manage, 
dare, etc., and, in part, forget); non-restructuring verbs include intend (= plan), 
announce, usually decide and other syntactic control verbs . . . propositional 
verbs and factive verbs”. He also notes that there is a cline from a non- 
restructuring verb, through restructuring verbs, to auxiliaries.
The argument in this paper is that these restructuring facts are not facts 
of syntax. They are facts to do with a single construction — the xcomp 
c onstruction — having different semantic patterns associated with it, and they 
are to do with the semantics having changed over time, due to (no doubt) the 
grammaticalization of some of the lexical items which occur in the relevant 
construction. I propose now to explore this claim by looking at the changes that 
are necessary if we want to account for the development of future will. In 
the discussion that follows, I shall compare will with intend. The reason is 
simple — intend has the sense that the historical source of will, Old English 
willan, had.
We can see the difference between a verb which takes an xcomp, where 
there is a discrete subordinate proposition, and one which combines semanti-
cally with the sense of the xcomp in Figures 4 and 5. Figure 4 represents the 
10.  The term “restructuring infinitive” is unhelpful. Miller is really discussing the whole con-
struction involving both the infinitive and the matrix verb.
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syntax and semantics of intend, which is listed in Miller’s category of non- 
restructuring verbs. Figure 5 represents the syntax and semantics of will, 
which is not just a modal, but which expresses future tense in English. Note 
that the state of affairs which identifies two separate propositions, that is 
M iller’s category of biclausal, or non-restructuring verbs, involves separate 
temporal specifications for each of the events. Note too that it involves a rela-
tion between these events. Gisborne (2010) chapter 3 presents an extended 
analysis of possible relations between events. For now, we can take (8) to see 
how in certain kinds of xcomp structure it is necessary to have an analysis of 
particular relations between events.
(8) Jane caused/ forced/persuaded Peter to leave.
In (8), Peter to leave is the ‘result’ of the matrix verb.11 That is, there is a spe-
cific semantic relation that holds between event 1 and event 2. This analysis of 
predicative complementation is relevant to the analysis of auxiliation, because 
there are three different things which happen in auxiliation:
–  the emergence of a discrete class of (auxiliary) verbs (modals and 
a spectuals);
–  a raising pattern but expressing one proposition (or event) not two;
–  (in some cases) subjectification.
We will look first at the diagrams in Figures 4 and 5, and then consider the way 
in which the diachrony works.
In Figure 4, ‘intending’, the sense of intended, has two arguments, which I 
have called Er and Ee. We can treat “Er” as a gloss over the arguments that link 
to underived subjects, and we can treat Ee as a gloss of the arguments that link 
to underived objects. In the case of a verb like intend, the Ee will also link to 
the referent of its that clause complement in examples such as we intended 
that she should go. In the case of a verb such as intend, we can claim that the 
semantic structure associated with an xcomp will be in the same semantic rela-
tion as the semantic structure associated with a that clause — that is, it will 
take an Er and an Ee, and it will link its Ee to the semantic structure associated 
with the xcomp, in this case to run. The diagram therefore says that in its se-
mantics, intend is a two-place predicate, whose Ee must denote a proposition. 
In this case, the propositional Ee is expressed by the referent of the xcomp. 
(Verbs like forget, which take either to or that have a single semantics, as-
sociated with two different syntactic valencies.) The diagram also shows that 
11.  The examples in (8) are different from those discussed so far, because they involve matrix 
verbs which take an object as well as an xcomp. cause is a raising-to-object or “Exceptional 
Case Marking” verb, whereas force and persuade are both object control verbs.
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both ‘intending’ and ‘that Felix will run’ have a time value, and the time value 
of ‘intending’ is before that of ‘that Felix will run’. Note too that the Er of ‘in-
tending’ is agentive: it is not possible to participate in involuntary intending.
Let us compare this with future will.12 Hilpert (2008) argues that the Eng-
lish future with will is a tense and I assume Hilpert’s analysis. Hilpert (2008: 
100 –105) presents compelling present-day collostructional evidence that de-
sire and intention are no longer central elements of the construction’s meaning. 
He explores the verbs that enter into the future construction with will and 
shows that the construction reveals “a clear preference for future events that 
are independent of intentional agents, low in transitivity and low in dynamic-
ity” (Hilpert 2008: 105). Whether it is inflectional or lexical, tense is a con-
struction: it composes with the sense of the verb to form a complex predicate, 
where the temporal location of the predicate is determined by tense, and the 
nature of the predicate, whether it is a state or event, and whether it is a com-
plex event or not, is determined by the meaning of the verb. In the case of a 
future tense, on Hilpert’s analysis, will supplies the temporal meaning, and the 
verb it occurs with supplies the sense, and the nature of the event. I therefore 
treat future tense as a complex predicate where each of the words involved 
corresponds to a different part of the predication. (It is tense, for example, that 
brings the requirement that the predication should have a subject.)
There’s a simplified representation of Felix will run in Figure 5. In this rep-
resentation, I have shown that the xcomp relation is associated with a single 
12. See also Bergs (2010).
Figure 4. Felix intended to run
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event. The structure in Figure 5 is the third type of predicative complementa-
tion I mentioned in the discussion of Figures 2 and 3. The point is not that this 
is the emergence of a raising structure, but that this is a new construction as-
sociated with tense and single predication distributed over two lexical items. 
Here there is no separate running event which is the semantic argument of the 
sense of will. Instead, the sense of will composes with the semantic structure 
associated with run to create a single semantic predication, which is a future 
instance of a single event. In this respect, then, Felix will run is quite different 
from Felix intends to run, where there are clearly two separate predications, 
and equally clearly two separate events.
As modern English future tense will is historically derived from Old Eng-
lish willan, which meant ‘intending’, there has to be a diachronic structural 
path from the situation represented in Figure 4 to the situation represented in 
Figure 5. Note that it cannot just be the case that the word will underwent 
grammaticalization: the whole construction had to emerge as well, because of 
the structural difference between having a relationship between events, and 
one where the event is shared by the xcomp’s head and the xcomp itself. The 
alternative account, where there was no corresponding change to the xcomp 
construction, would mean that it was not possible to treat will as a tense. It 
would, instead have to be treated as a modality, with strong implicatures of 
futurity.
There is another point to be borne in mind when comparing the two dia-
grams. Both diagrams show temporal information. In the case of Figure 4, 
there is a representation of the fact that the time of the non-finite clause comes 
after the time of intending. In the case of Figure 5, it is shown that the time of 
the running event comes after the speech time. This difference is, I think, sig-
Figure 5. Felix will run
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nificant, because it demonstrates a degree of subjectification; both subjectivity 
and tense are deictic. In the case of future tense, the speaker makes a predic-
tion, with a high degree of commitment and, of course, the speaker is the deic-
tic centre of the temporal situation and the prediction. Given that the structure 
in Figure 5 is more subjective than that in Figure 4, what we see is that con-
structions can also develop subjectivity as they evolve.
We can see that there is evidence for both construction types in Old English. 
Warner (1993: 167–168) finds evidence for simple future examples with 
 willan, in impersonal and passive structures, as well as with verbs that do not 
have a volitional subject and stative verbs. If we take the example in (9), we 
can see that there is a degree of ambiguity in some relevant Old English 
 examples. The example (Paris Psalter 123.2) is taken from Denison (1993: 
299) in a discussion of Goossens (1982: 79).
(9) wen is, þæt hi us lifigende lungre wyllen | sniome
 expectation is that they us living quickly intend at-once
 forsweolgan
 swallow-up
 ‘it is likely that they will swallow us up at once’
But there is an alternative reading: what about ‘it is likely that they intend to 
swallow us up at once’? The example is ambiguous between the two readings. 
For the purposes of this paper, that is significant, because it means that the 
structure of the construction in (9) must be ambiguous between the two in-
terpretations as well, as long as the claim that this example is a genuine case 
of the future is sustainable. Of course, it is necessary to bear in mind that at 
this stage of the history of the language the ambiguity could be in the se-
mantics (and therefore pragmatic) rather than in the structure (and therefore 
s emantic).
Do other auxiliary constructions require the pattern in Figure 5? I think that 
it is straightforward to see that both have and be aspectual auxiliation involve 
structures similar to the one in Figure 5, although there are some differences in 
that I think the aspectual auxiliaries express a single proposition, but one which 
involves two discrete events. In any case we can conclude that these structures 
evolved alongside each other; the development of both the future tense will 
construction, and the progressive and perfect aspectual constructions. It is, 
then, a new construction type, which developed in the history of English along-
side the processes of auxiliation. The conclusion then is that the evolution of 
the construction in Figure 5 is a product of constructional change which is 
r elated to the grammaticalization of the English auxiliaries. One interesting 
wrinkle is that the construction in Figure 5 sanctions fewer instances than the 
structure in Figure 4, and is lexically specific to will. This just goes to show 
that constructional change is complex, and there is a lot of work that remains 
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to be done if we are to understand how the inventory of constructions, and how 
constructions themselves, change in diachrony.
5.	 Case	study	2:	impersonals	and	raising	predicates
In my previous case study, there was an implicit argument to the effect that a 
fine-grained analysis was necessary to see how the internal dimensions of a 
construction changed. In this section, I develop that perspective, although here 
my argument is slightly different — I am taking up a data set explored by 
Trousdale (2008c), where Trousdale claims that the changes in the English 
impersonal construction are best handled by thinking about the transitive con-
struction. Trousdale concludes that the transitive construction becomes more 
schematic, sanctioning a wider range of instances, and thus impersonals be-
come subsumed under this construction type. In this section, my agenda is to 
offer a defence of a more traditional position, that the nature of English sub-
jects changed, and that the change in English impersonals was due to dative 
experiencers becoming regularized as subjects. There are various discussions 
of the diachrony of this construction and a useful discussion of the different 
positions in Denison (1993: 61–102). Barðdal (2006) also discusses a number 
of related issues.
However, there are three complications: (i) as English lost case, it developed 
the subject requirement, and so lost the ability to have unrealized subjects; (ii) 
as Trousdale points out, most impersonals had a variant with a nominative 
subject which makes his suggestion that those with nominative subjects sur-
vived, while those that had dative subjects died out, an appealing one; (iii) as 
Allen (1995) has shown, there are clear examples of non-nominative argu-
ments in Old English behaving like subjects — so for some speakers, at least, 
these were already subjects in Old English. Essentially, what I am arguing for 
in this section is that there is a process of regularization: experiencers, by de-
fault, are associated with subjects (Dowty 1991) see (11); subjects, by default, 
become obligatory in English; and the variable morphological realization of 
subjects which can be seen in Old English is also regularized so that the non-
default expression of subjects becomes more or less impossible. This is Hud-
son’s (1997) category strengthening.13
However, we should also entertain the possibility that not all dative experi-
encers in Old English were subjects, and that as part of the process of regular-
13.  Los (2009) identifies other changes in English subjects, which are to do with the pragmatics 
of information structure, and are to do with the loss of the V2 strategy. These changes are like 
Trousdale’s (2008c) increased schematicity, in that the subject construction sanctions a larger 
number of instances, and instances of different kinds, as it acquires a more general meaning. 
Note that the changes Los describes are later than those discussed here.
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ization dative experiencers became associated with subjecthood. So how did 
impersonals’ experiencer arguments come to be reanalysed as subjects? This is 
a change which is found in several languages from Icelandic through to unre-
lated languages of South Asia. The answer is that their semantics are broadly 
compatible, leading to a mismatch between the case of the (new) subject, and 
its syntactic function.
To make the analysis, it is necessary to come up with an appropriately fine-
grained view of constructions. In this case, we need to think about subjects as 
a kind of construction, where there is a syntactic dependency between the finite 
verb and its subject argument, which is matched by a semantic relation. This is 
the standard WG analysis, and we call the semantic relation the Er, which 
stands for “the agent prototype”. The claim is that semantics (and pragmatics) 
lead the change, which is common in syntactic argument reanalyses (Denison 
2009), with the result that semantics trumps morphology. We can begin by tak-
ing a look at Old English impersonals. There is an example in (10).
(10) him ofhreow þæs mannes
 3SM-dat pity-3SPast the-gen man-gen
 to-him was-pity because-of-the-man
 ‘He pitied the man’
 Or: ‘The man caused pity in him’
The example in (10) involves a verb with two oblique arguments — a dative 
pronoun, him, which denotes the experiencer of the sense of the verb, and a 
genitive noun phrase þæs mannes which denotes the stimulus of the experience 
that the verb denotes. The verb does not have a nominative subject, and unless 
the dative argument is taken as a non-nominative subject, it doesn’t have a 
subject argument at all.
A reasonable question would be why is it possible for non-subjects to be 
reanalysed as subjects? The answer would be that the semantics sets it up. We 
can explore this by looking at two views of argument realization and the pro-
totypical semantics associated with a particular grammatical function. Dowty 
(1991) presents a view of agents and patients as prototypical semantic func-
tions. He lists a range of properties for the proto-agent and separate properties 
for the proto-patient. Schlesinger (1992) argues that experiencers are agents, 
and we can combine these two perspectives to see how it would be possible for 
experiencers to be identified as subject-related semantic arguments, because 
experiencer was part of the proto-agent package.
Dowty’s list of properties for the proto-agent are given in (11). We do not 
need to explore the list of properties for proto-patient here, because they are 
not relevant to the case at hand.
(11) a. volitional involvement in the event or state
 b. sentience (and/or perception)
Brought to you by | University of Edinburgh
Authenticated | 129.215.19.197
Download Date | 7/15/13 4:03 PM
176 N. Gisborne
 c. causing an event or change of state in another participant
 d. movement (relative to the position of another participant)
 (e. exists independently of the event named by the verb.)
  (Dowty 1991: 572)
An impersonal verb such as ofhreow does not necessarily involve many of 
these properties, unless we think that having an emotion is volitional. How-
ever, only a sentient entity can feel pity, and non-sentient entities can induce 
pity.
We can model this change in a WG network. We need to think of “subject-
of ” as a construction, linking a prototype semantics and a syntactic function, 
which is realized by a prototypical case when a language has a case system. I 
give an example of a prototypical subject in Figure 6.
Note that the Er stands for prototypical agent. The structure in Figure 6 con-
trasts with an experiencer argument in Figure 7.
The claim, then, is that the experiencer semantics causes the grammatical 
function marked by ? to be reanalysed as a subject, as part of the process of 
regularisation, because “experiencer” is part of the agent prototype.
One way of exploring whether it is possible for an argument which is not 
marked nominative to be a syntactic subject is to look at the possibility of it 
raising into subject predicate over a so-called “raising predicate”. In modern 
English, raising predicates are those predicates such as seem which do not as-
sign a thematic role to their subjects, and which share their subjects with their 
predicative complements in the xcomp construction described in the previous 
section. In (12), we can see an example where this kind of subject-raising has 
Figure 6. The structure of the canonical subject
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happened in Old English from an impersonal predicate which has an accusa-
tive argument, hine and a prepositional argument beforan gode. The imper-
sonal predicate in the example is gesceamian.
(12) hine sceal on domes dæg gesceamian beforan gode
 him-ACC shall on doom’s day shame before God
 ‘he shall feel ashamed before God on the Day of Judgement’
 (HomU 37, 238.12 [Denison 1993: 301])
In (12), hine has raised over sceal. Its case is assigned by gesceamian. Bresnan 
(1994) presents arguments for using raising as a diagnostic of subjecthood, 
when she explores the syntax of locative inversion. The examples in (13) are 
examples where the PP has to be analysed as a subject, because it has raised 
over the relevant predicate, seems (see Webelhuth’s contribution this volume 
for a discussion of locative inversion.)
(13) a. [In the garden]i seems  i to be the best place (to smoke).
 b. [In the garden]i seems  i to suit him fine.
Allen (1995: 105–106) discusses experiencers in terms of word order facts and 
argues that dative experiencers are subjects in Old English: “. . . it was seman-
tic roles which determined the relative order of the NPs here, with E xperiencers 
tending to precede Themes.” One way of capturing the word order facts is in a 
three-stage story: (i) the subject-of construction is a mapping between a sub-
ject (morpho-syntactic) grammatical function and a proto-agent thematic role; 
Figure 7. The experiencer argument
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(ii) experiencers are part of the agent prototype and therefore part of the subject 
prototype; (iii) subjects precede other arguments. Note that Allen says, “if we 
assume that the Experiencer was actually the subject, all the positional possi-
bilities follow automatically.”
We can think about Allen’s position again in terms of the semantics of gram-
maticalization. It is commonly understood that semantic change leads gram-
matical change — and here we have a paradigm case where a semantics which 
is associated with Subjects gives rise to the grammatical function actually 
b eing a subject, even as early as in Old English, in violation of the form of the 
word which realizes the subject-of relation.
One way of thinking about non-nominative subjects is as an exponent of 
morphological lag in grammaticalization. Given the usage-based assumptions 
of construction grammars, we can understand the process as one where there is 
a semantic assignment of the experiencer argument to an agent prototype, 
which causes the syntactic argument to be reanalysed as a syntactic subject 
because agent prototype semantics is associated, by default, with subjects. This 
in turn gives rise to a further regularisation where the subjects are associated 
with nominative morphology.
The same explanation will also work for Icelandic quirky case marking, first 
discussed in Andrews (1976). In (14), Henni is a non-nominative (dative) sub-
ject. Van Valin (1991) demonstrates that this argument must be a syntactic ar-
gument because, as the subsequent example in (15) demonstrates, it raises over 
the Icelandic word for seem.
(14) Henni hefur alltaf þótt Ólafur leiðinlegur.
 Her (D) has always thought Olaf ( N) boring ( Nsg)
 ‘She has always considered Olaf boring.’
In this case, we can assume that semantics and syntax line up in the argument 
linking, and that the morphology does not represent the syntactic relations.
(15) Henni virðist alltaf hafa þótt Ólafur leiðinlegur.
 Her (D) seem always haveINF thought Olaf ( N) boring ( Nsg)
 ‘She always seems to have found Olaf boring.’ (Van Valin 1991).
This raises quite significant questions about what cues speakers exploit, be-
cause it might be thought that morphology would be significant and salient in 
acquisition. But what we have seen in the examples in this section is that syn-
tax trumps morphology, and that a semantic reanalysis can drive a syntactic 
reanalysis, overriding morphological information. This is probably not a sur-
prising outcome — morphological irregularity is rife and it must surely be part 
of the learner’s experience that morphology is a crude guide to meaning and 
structure.
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6.	 Conclusions
In this paper, I have argued that in order to understand processes of grammati-
calization, it is necessary to understand associated processes of constructional 
change, because grammatical change occurs in a constructional context. I have 
exploited WG as my theoretical tool, for the reason that it offers a useful way 
of understanding constructions both in terms of their internal dimensions, and 
as fine-grained tools by which we can understand reanalyses of particular 
grammatical functions. There are, I think, two main conclusions from this 
p aper: there is outstanding fine-grained work to be done on the constructional 
repository of even as thoroughly described a language as English; and it is 
necessary to have a debate about what the granularity of a construction might 
be. We need to discuss, argue for, a typology of constructions for English, so 
that we can have a realistic discussion about, among other things, how pro-
cesses of change have proceeded.
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